Commit 4c9af559 authored by cmiller@zippy.cornsilk.net's avatar cmiller@zippy.cornsilk.net
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Bug#28984: crasher on connect with out of range password length in \ 

	protocol

Fixed duplicated code, same as last commit.

One could send a malformed packet that caused the server to SEGV.  In 
recent versions of the password protocol, the client tells the server 
what length the ciphertext is (almost always 20).  If that length was
large enough to overflow a signed char, then the number would jump to 
very large after being casted to unsigned int.

Instead, cast the *passwd char to uchar.
parent 3ab51acf

sql/sql_parse.cc

+4 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1445,11 +1445,14 @@ bool dispatch_command(enum enum_server_command command, THD *thd, 
      Old clients send null-terminated string ('\0' for empty string) for

      password.  New clients send the size (1 byte) + string (not null

      terminated, so also '\0' for empty string).



      Cast *passwd to an unsigned char, so that it doesn't extend the sign

      for *passwd > 127 and become 2**32-127 after casting to uint.

    */

    char db_buff[NAME_LEN+1];                 // buffer to store db in utf8 

    char *db= passwd;

    uint passwd_len= thd->client_capabilities & CLIENT_SECURE_CONNECTION ? 

      *passwd++ : strlen(passwd);

      (uchar)(*passwd++) : strlen(passwd);

    db+= passwd_len + 1;

#ifndef EMBEDDED_LIBRARY

    /* Small check for incomming packet */